

acceptance of almost any kind of artifact or performance as art, and the feminist critique of excluding traditional domestic arts such as quilt making from the fine arts. By the mid-1980s isolated rural carvers, weavers, or chair makers and self-taught urban painters, or sculptors were besieged by collectors, dealers, and curators. As the popularity of folk and outsider art accelerated, folklorists worried about the erosion of tradition, skeptics decried financial exploitation, and the concepts of folk art and outsider art became increasingly contested.

Folklorists, for example, have attacked the art-world idea of folk art for focusing on the isolated "work of art" rather than the communal context in which makers work. In this respect, many folklorists are particularly critical of the assimilation of outsider art or self-taught art to folk art, since, to folklorists, genuine folk art is always "taught" in the sense of being learned by word of mouth and demonstration. Some folklorists have shown that many of the so-called folk portraits that form the core of many private or museum collections were mostly done by itinerant middle-class artists with formal training. Other folklorists have gone in the opposite direction and claimed that given the prestige of the term *art*, the concept of art should be expanded to include all folk objects, performances, and practices (Glassie, 1995). Still others have suggested not only expanding the concept of art but expanding the definition of *folk* to include the everyday lives of contemporary urban and suburban people (Jones, 1993). One prominent cultural historian has argued that what we call popular culture should simply be regarded as "the folk art of industrial society" (Levine, 1992).

One way of avoiding these terminological confusions over the proper meaning of "folk" and "art," especially in anthropology and folklore studies, is to avoid the terms "art" and "folk art" entirely and replace them with the broader concept of *material culture* (Ames, 1977). Another approach that skirts the issue of what is or is not "art" or "folk art," comes from aesthetic theory rather than social science, and focuses on what is called *everyday aesthetics*, which deals with the aesthetic experience of ordinary objects of any provenance as well as with the aesthetic experience of nature and the environment (Saito, 2007; Leddy, 2012).

Whereas earlier in the twentieth century the idea of folk art formed a more or less stable placeholder in a conceptual set that included fine art and popular or mass art, it has now become part of the debate about whether the idea of art has any defining boundaries. Although the meaning of both folk and art are highly contested, the term folk art itself does not seem likely to vanish given the heavy intellectual, institutional, and financial investment in it and the persistence of what many people consider "folk" communities, especially in parts of Oceania, Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Unlike the term primitive art, which has all but disappeared because

of the pejorative connotations of "primitive," the word folk still conveys the positive connotations of honesty, simplicity, naturalness, and has links with feelings of ethnic or national pride. Yet the homey connotations of "folk" should not lead us to forget the role that the idea of the folk and folk art played in Nazi ideology or the way Japanese militarists exploited the Japanese "folk craft" (*Mingei*) movement for their nationalist program in the 1930s. The debates about the meaning of folk art reflect in part the increased awareness among philosophers, art historians, and social scientists that the basic concepts of aesthetics, including that of (fine or high) art itself, are historical constructions under constant negotiation.

[See also Craft; Fashion; Outsider Art; and Popular Culture.]

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Jessica Jaques « Food (aesthetics of) », Oxford Encyclopedia of Aesthetics, second edition, 2014)

FOOD. Food has not been a matter of great aesthetic importance until quite recently. Aesthetics of food as a discipline emerged in the last decade of the twentieth-century and is now growing exponentially. Scholars have coined the term "gustatory aesthetics" to characterize this new discipline. Four practices closely related to gustatory aesthetics play the role given to arts in traditional aesthetics: food art, edible art, research cooking, and revolutionary cooking.

Gustatory Aesthetics. Historically, the relationship between aesthetics and philosophy of taste and the relationship between philosophy of taste and philosophy of food have been asymmetrical, the first being bridged much earlier than the second. Both relationships are consequences of seventeenth-century empiricism. Aesthetics has, at least partially, identified itself with the philosophy of taste since its establishment as a discipline in the eighteenth century. But only very recently has aesthetics engaged with the philosophy of food, its founding text being Deane Curtin's and Lisa Heldke's, *Cooking, Eating, Thinking: Transformative Philosophies of Food* (1992). Philosophy of food deals with the aesthetic qualities of food and their productive and receptive conditions; it involves ethical concerns related to nourishment and sustenance as well as scarcity and provision; it addresses hunger and eating disorders, vegetarianism, dietary choices and their cultural frames, conviviality and community; it is also concerned with food and cooking as an new and powerful institution that includes enterprises, tourism, technologies, science, and art. One of the primary undertakings of the philosophy of food is to vindicate food and cooking as symbolic forms (Douglas, 1982), as the arts and the sciences have been viewed, following the tradition of Ernst Cassirer, Erwin Panofsky, Fritz Saxl, Aby Warburg, and Nelson Goodman.

Since its beginnings, *aesthetics of food*, as a branch of the philosophy of food, has been primarily developed from the receptive activity, arising as a non-metaphorical philosophy of taste. With the metaphorical use of *taste* established long before, Voltaire settled its non-metaphorical use in 1757 in the *Encyclopédie* of Diderot and d'Alembert: "This sense [some lines later termed 'sensual taste' (*goût sensuel*)], this capacity for discriminating between different foods, has given rise, in all known languages, to the metaphorical word 'taste' [some lines later termed 'intellectual taste' (*goût intellectuel*)] to designate the discernment of beauty and flaws in

all the arts. It discriminates as quickly as the tongue and the palate, and like physical taste it anticipates reflection."


From then on, differences and affinities were settled between that which was designated, respectively, "gustatory taste" (the non-metaphorical use of the word, Voltaire's "sensual taste") and "critical taste" (the usual contemporary term for its metaphorical use, Voltaire's "intellectual taste"). Both kinds of taste were, since the mid-eighteenth century, capacities of discernment that anticipate reflection; both were bounded by "a great resemblance," as Hume said in *Of the Standard of Taste*, written in the same year as Voltaire's entry on taste. The recognition of this resemblance enhanced the metaphorical use of "critical taste" as well as the awareness of the enormous cognitive potential underlying "gustatory taste," implicitly suggesting the coincidence between the etymology of *savoir*—flavor—(sapor -oris, coming from the substantive of *sapere*) and that of *savoir*—knowledge—(also stemming from *sapere*).

These proposals had to overcome Kant's forceful philosophical disappointments with gustatory aesthetics in his *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (1790), and had to wait for their democratization. In the first decades of the nineteenth century, gustatory taste was democratized in restaurants as artistic taste was democratized in museums and salons. It was at that time that it found its proper discourse. Hence, in 1825, French gastronome Jean Anthelme Brillat-Savarin published in Paris *Physiologie du Goût, ou méditations de gastronomie transcendante* (The Physiology of Taste, or Meditations on Transcendental Gastronomy). With the inclusion of the *adjective* transcendante (translated as "transcendental") in his title, Brillat-Savarin was indicating his antagonist; "meditations on transcendental gastronomy" were to give rise to gustatory taste as a reflective faculty in response to Kant's arguments.

But Brillat-Savarin's philosophical effort did not immediately flourish. Gustatory aesthetics had to wait more than a century and a half, until Carolyn Korsmeyer's *Making Sense of Taste: Taste, Food and Philosophy* (1999), to attain philosophical and academic stature. This work began an inquiry to establish a vocabulary and proper arguments for gustatory aesthetics in the search of a kind of reason, of a way of world-making that, following Michel Onfray, can be termed the gourmand reason (*la raison gourmande*). The gourmand reason is a kind of understanding of the world that depends on our aesthetic relationship to food and poses new challenges to the old term *taste* (Graw, Kleefeld, and Rottmann, 2009, see especially Menke, pp. 38–46).

Nowadays gustatory aesthetics is a flourishing academic field included in academic food studies (which emerged in the 1990s) as well as in departments of philosophy, history of art, and cultural studies. In addition to its academic methodologies, it pays close attention to events involving both art and cooking that take place in institutional artistic venues, as well as to the critical vocabulary and arguments developed by food writers.

Food Art, Edible Art, Research Cooking, and Revolutionary Cooking. Gustatory aesthetics is to food and



247-Vegetable Soup in Textures (plate number 247), 1994, El Bulli. Photo by Frances Guillamet. COURTESY OF THE ARTIST

cooking as aesthetics is to the arts. Four practices are in close relationship to gustatory argumentation. They emerged successively and can be termed food art, edible art, research cooking, and revolutionary cooking. Considered from the perspectives of aesthetics as a discipline, food art and edible art have to do with the artistic status of food and the use of food as an artistic medium, while research and revolutionary cooking have to do with aesthetic practices that are close to the arts but keep some degree of autonomy.

Despite having been identified only recently, *food art* has existed since the beginning of civilization. The term identifies those artistic practices whose principal material and symbolic referent is food, including its processes of production and consumption. Food art deals either with the representation of food (as for example in some ancient Egyptian paintings or the Dutch still lifes) or with food as a medium; Gordon Matta-Clark, Daniel Spoerri, Allen Ruppersberg, Antoni Miralda, and Jana Starbak, are the most representative contemporary artists of food art. Many others—from Paul McCarthy to Marina Abramovich, Wim Delvoe, and Carsten Höller—have worked on this topic with certain regularity, and yet others have done so occasionally, such as Marta Rosler and Hannah Collins.

Edible art, which emerged in the 1960s, is a specialization within food art. As the term indicates, it is a kind of art that can be eaten and not just contemplated. This is the case, for example, with some of the performances of Miralda, Lili Fischer, or Tiravanija, with the installations of Christine Bernhard, sculptures of Michel Blazy, and videos of John Bock. However, what should more seriously be called *edible art* is that which has been or is produced in some restaurants where the procedures and appearances of the meals are artified, which means that they are given the productive, receptive, and institutional procedures of works of art.

Research cooking can be defined as a twenty-first century practice that inherits all the creative impulse and innovation of twentieth-century *avant-garde cooking*, from *nouvelle cui-*

sine to the so-called *molecular cooking* and *techno-emotional cooking*. The term *research cooking* is analogous to *artistic research* and its contemporary debates and points to the increasing intersection between cooking and the arts. Research cooking has seven distinguishable features:

1. Self-awareness as a symbolic form, i.e., as a physical place for thought and knowledge, in the same way as a picture is a physical place for reflection;
2. Emphasis on the receptive moment (in this case, gastronomy) as a continuation of the creative process;
3. Development of mutual influences between creativity and research;
4. Appropriation of certain ways of artistic, scientific, and technological research, due to the assumption of a certain collapse of creativity in cooking;
5. Consideration of sophisticated technology as a privileged means but not as an end in itself;
6. Tendency to artification: increasing awareness of sharing artistic beliefs. Thus, research cooking understands itself as a mode of communication similar to art, including ways of reference such as imitation, expression, quotation, metaphor, and even humor and paradox;
7. Networking among chefs.

When research cooking achieves a paradigm shift, it can also be designed as *revolutionary cooking*. In this case, three features are added:

1. Involvement in the narrative of its own history and creative process by revisiting and inquiring archives, recipes, and critics in order to point out the essential moments of the paradigm shift.
2. Expansion beyond the *restaurant* as an institution to reach the public sphere, with books, catalogues, conferences, and, especially, through the Internet and social networks—a feature that can be termed post-institutional expansion.
3. Assertive social engagement.

Some of the pioneer chefs of research cooking and, in some cases, also of revolutionary cooking are: Gastón Acurio (Astrid & Gastón, Peru), Ferran Adrià (elBulli & elBulli-Foundation, Spain), Andoni Aduriz (Mugaritz, Spain), the team of Biko restaurant (Mexico), Heston Blumenthal (The Fat Duck, England), Massimo Bottura (Osteria Francescana, Italy), Michel and Sébastien Bras (Bras, France), René Redzepi (Noma, Denmark), Joan Roca (El Celler de Can Roca, Spain), and Seiji Yamamoto (Nihonryori RyuGin, Japan).

Food art, edible art, research cooking, and revolutionary cooking are now topics of deep interest to artistic institutions in their exploration of new fields of artiness. One of the main events of this inquiry was the participation of the

restaurant elBulli in *Documenta XII*, in 2007, in Kassel, Germany. The restaurant was designated as Pavilion G, despite being some 800 miles away, in Roses, Spain.

Renovation of the Vocabulary of Traditional Aesthetics: Facing Fresh Disinterestedness. Gustatory aesthetics contributes vigorously to the renovation of both the vocabulary and the arguments of traditional aesthetics and the philosophy of art and especially in the revision of four of their primary aspects: the proper senses for aesthetic judgment, disinterestedness beyond pure contemplation, categorization of the aesthetic qualities that omit visual parameters, and creativity and reception in regards to the ephemeral.

Following contemporary philosophy, gustatory aesthetics vindicates physicality and bodily centrality in a way that has never before been done in the history of aesthetics. The main organs of gustatory taste, tongue, palate, and olfactory receptors, are not on our face but inside; as such, they are perceived as part of our inner body. The object of taste has to be violently masticated and gulped, thus becoming an embodied otherness from what it initially was and turning into a component of our inner selves. Although tongue and palate are also organs of talk, the philosophical tradition, bounded in different degrees by Neoplatonism, anti-hedonism, and intellectualism, has detached them from *logos* and has redefined the senses they entail: taste, smell, and touch, as “lower (cognitive) senses,” are opposed to the “higher senses,” primarily sight and, secondarily, hearing (Brady in Kaplan, 2012, pp. 69–86). Gustatory aesthetics argues for the convergence of taste, smell, and touch in the synesthetic faculty of discernment that is the gustatory taste, i.e., the capacity of flavor. This faculty aims to reformulate the old correlations between subjectivity and objectivity as well as between memory and imagination in aesthetic judgments, in order to go beyond the old saying “De gustibus non est disputandum.”

Disinterestedness has, since the “First Moment” of Kant’s *Critique of the Power of Judgment*, been the key concept of the qualitative definition of beauty and the faculty to discern it, that is, critical (metaphorical) taste. The issues are now whether this key concept can stand for gustatory taste and how one can be disinterested toward an aesthetic object that is also nourishment (Sweeney in Kaplan, 2012, pp. 52–68). One way to understand this is to consider that the affinities between the aesthetic appreciation of Leonardo’s *The Virgin of the Rocks* (both in the Louvre or in the National Gallery of London Version) and that of a *cuisine course* depend on the distinction between their instrumental and aesthetic values: nourishment and religious devotion differ from the aesthetic qualities that concern an object, so that a *cuisine course* is not just a nutritious meal, just as Leonardo’s *Virgins* are not just a pious artifact. *Cuisine* is usually the chosen term to point to all aesthetic practices that expand from domestic to research cooking and revolutionary cooking, with the common peculiarity of being elab-

orated beyond merely alimentary needs. In this way, cuisine reveals itself as a radical field proposing aesthetic arguments that defend disinterestedness as the main attitude for a proper exercise of taste (Gigante, 2005), whether metaphorical or non-metaphorical. The same gap that exists between nourishment and cuisine exists also between necessity and freedom, freedom being the state of mind of disinterestedness, creativity, and imagination. The free play between imagination and understanding delineated by Kant is, in spite of his own conceptions, more genuine in cuisine than anywhere. Dealing essentially with gustatory appreciative faculties—taste, touch, and smell, which is to say, flavor—cuisine is a kind of “blind” imagination that emancipates itself from (viewed) images and emphasizes the etymology of *Einbildungskraft* (the German word for imagination), which connotes construction, upbringing, and culture.

Gustatory imagination, reflection, and sense are as much a matter of the receptive moment as the productive one and confer to gastronomy—as the activity of judgment using the gustatory taste—the power of expanding the creative process. This expansion is now providing aesthetics with the richer vocabulary of criticism, which aims to go beyond the hegemony of beauty and its synonyms and antonyms in order to reach the emancipation of aesthetic qualities that depend on taste, smell, touch, and flavor. Palatable, delicious, savory, tasteful, tasty, ambrosial, yummy, and dainty; tasteless, unsavory, sour, clumsy, disgusting, nasty, nauseous, repugnant, and detestable; all these become fresh words to regenerate the recurrently obsolete visual hegemony of aesthetic vocabulary. This is a shift that could be termed the *flavoring turn* of aesthetics.

Drive of New Concepts for Contemporary Aesthetics: The Flavoring Turn. Since at least the 1960s, aesthetics has been in need of renovation in order to include contemporary art. With the traditional aesthetic vocabulary being partially exiguous, some new notions and arguments are required for the philosophical narration of contemporary practices.

In the earlier characterization of revolutionary cooking, some of these notions have already been given, the most relevant being artification, receptiveness, artistic research, post-institutional expansion, and engagement with the public sphere. Contemporary gustatory aesthetics deals with these notions from the “flavoring turn.” Building upon the designation “performative turn” coined by Erika Fischer-Lichte, flavoring turn is the specific performative turn that has to do with all the qualitative achievements of cuisine and can be framed by the main aspects of *relational aesthetics* as developed by Nicolas Bourriaud at the end of the 1990s. In fact, the first fruitful gustatory practices that transcended the field of cuisine to reach museums or art centers have been considered as examples of *relational art*, a qualification used for some practices from the beginning of the 1990s, especially those by Tiravanija.

Discerning and judging from the synesthetic capacity of flavor is the main demand of gustatory aesthetics. This requires the inclusion of the chief characteristics of performative practices (performance, dance, theatre, live music, circus, street art) and relational art with regards to the centrality of the body (Curtin, 1992, pp. 3–22) and also gustatory receptiveness. Certainly, the flavoring turn radicalizes the main issues of the performative turn and of relational aesthetics: the centrality of the event and the ephemeral, the body, and the gesture as artistic matters, as well as the claim of an engaged reception.

Gustatory aesthetics achieves this radicalization in a process of artification of cuisine in general and of research cooking and revolutionary cooking in particular, in the conviction that they share with the other arts some of their main characteristics: they are modes of aesthetic thinking addressed to sentient thinkers, and they disturb, subvert, or cancel the rules of everyday communication. As in many other arts, the authors and the audience of the practices regarded by gustatory aesthetics have a high degree of self-awareness of their symbolic potential, which implies that they are conscious about their cognitive possibilities and about their competences in what is generally known as artistic research. They are ways of embodied meaning and possibilities for reflection, exactly as is a painting, a musical composition, or a poem. They relate to the main topics of art: love and death; humanity and community; good and evil; happiness, transcendence and fear; and have a special tie to memories (Fabio Parasecoli, in Allhoff and Monroe, 2007, pp. 101–114). In their procedures, beyond strictly flavoring, one can find an increasing proliferation of archives and reasoned catalogues in a search for self-understanding and self-relatedness. One finds also an inquiry into other aesthetic practices in order to overtake the boundaries of their proper creativity, as do all contemporary arts, but with greater audacity. It is this audacity that has brought revolutionary cooking out of the restaurant, reaching, on the one hand, museums and artistic events and, on the other, the public sphere through the Internet and new social networks, in a kind of post-institutional drive that attracts academic gustatory aesthetics to other expanding fields.

Gustatory Aesthetics and the Public Sphere. At the end of his article on taste in the *Encyclopédie*, Voltaire uses the expression *le partage* to refer to taste (in particular, when discussing “European taste”). *Partage*, for French speakers, simultaneously connotes “making (new) parts” and “sharing them”; it means a way of sharing something that has been deeply analyzed (or cut up) before, and which is reconceptualized from the public sphere, not from individuals. This is exactly what the original concept of taste, both metaphorical and non-metaphorical, sought to mean and what gustatory aesthetics wants to achieve: a delicacy (as Hume named it in his *Of the Standard of Taste*) for individual discernment, which could indicate

the basis for the construction of the public sphere. Gustatory aesthetics points to a new *partage du sensible* or distribution of the sensible (following Rancière’s expression) that comes from the flavoring turn and aims to break down the hegemony of the visual. Cuisine being a language as universal as music or dance, twentieth-first-century gustatory aesthetics is involved in a natural way with networks, net-thoughts, and net-feelings, which overcome the class taste distinctions pointed out by Pierre Bourdieu and offer new paths in the democratization of taste. Nowadays, taste has to do with the primary aesthetic, economic, and political category of our times: precariousness, understood as a way to be in the world that is defined by the uncertainty, vulnerability, and insecurity of late capitalism. Gustatory aesthetics faces precariousness from a revolutionary standpoint, furnished by the Internet and social networks. Food events of any kind are no longer just institutional matters, but also post-institutional issues that link everyday aesthetic practices with artfulness, in a way that no other practice is able to do. Gustatory aesthetics can currently face Mary Douglas’s challenge in her pioneer text “Food as a system of communication” (1973) and recognize that food not only has a great symbolic force but also an everyday power of revolution. Institutions (restaurants and academic or artistic centers) have trouble following both. New professions are springing up (besides the already known food writers there are food designers, chef curators, agricultural landscape designers, and food communicators) in a field without public financial backing; some countries are reinventing their biopolitics and economies through food (Peru, for example, has tens of thousands of young people studying to become cooks); the issue of gender in cuisine is beginning to breach the hegemony of masculinity. For all these reasons, cuisine is starting to be understood as “a social weapon,” following Ferran Adrià’s expression, and gustatory aesthetics reviews the old *sensus communis aestheticus* with the powerful social engagements of these new ways of exercising the *partage*.

[See also Body; Contemporary Art; Craft; Creativity; Disgust; Epistemology; Everyday Aesthetics; Ideas, Aesthetic; Imagination; Kant, Immanuel; Perception; Pleasure; Politics; Qualities, Aesthetic; Rancière, Jacques; Reception Aesthetics; Relational Aesthetics; Ritual; Synaesthesia; Taste; and Transdisciplinary Aesthetics.]

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JÉSSICA JAUQUES

FORGERY. A forgery is a work of art whose history of production is intentionally misrepresented to a buyer or

audience, usually for financial gain. Not just any misrepresentation regarding the history of production of a work will do for forgery, however. If what is misrepresented is the temperature of the room at the time at which a work was created, the height or weight of the painter, whether the artist was talking or silent while he or she applied brush to canvas, or whether the painting was worked on continually or intermittently, the result is not forgery. Rather, forgery concerns misrepresentation respecting authorship or, in general, provenance or source of issue: forged Picasso paintings are possible, as are forged medieval frescos. Fraudulent intention is also necessary for a work to be forgery, in order to distinguish forgeries from misattributions. In the visual arts, a forger normally draws, paints, or sculpts work in the style of a famous artist and tries to sell the result, often in collusion with an unscrupulous dealer, as coming from the hand of a famous artist. Forgers seldom try to execute exact copies of existing authentic works, as such fakes are impossible to sell to informed buyers.

Forgery has vexed critics and philosophers as an aesthetic issue. The market value of any work of art will normally plummet if it can be shown to be faked, and museums will relegate to their basements paintings that are revealed to be forgeries, even though they may have delighted generations of viewers. Is this reasonable? If a work of art remains the same visual object after the revelation that it is a forgery, why should it be rejected aesthetically? Some theorists, notably Arthur Koestler and Alfred Lessing, have argued that only confusion and snobbery could be behind such rejection. The aesthetic value of art derives from the pleasure of immediate sensory experience, they claim, and it therefore can make no aesthetic difference if a work is revealed to be a forgery. This position can be developed for (1) a forgery that is an exact copy of an existing work, (2) a forgery that is a new work in the style of and attributed to another artist, and can be extended even to (3) an honest copy of an existing work or an honestly presented new work in another artist’s style.

The celebrated case of the Dutch forger Han van Meegeren (1889–1947) is a locus classicus of modern forgery. As van Meegeren’s promising artistic career faltered and declined in the 1920s, he began to see himself as a victim of critics, dealers, and academics. Partly from resentment and partly from greed, he began his new career by forging a *Laughing Cavalier* in the style of Franz Hals. Later, he moved on to the work of Jan Vermeer, whose paintings were of considerable rarity and market value (fewer than forty authentic Vermeers had survived into the twentieth century). His efforts culminated in *Christ and the Disciples at Emmaeus*, a pseudo-Vermeer he completed in 1937. To produce this painting he undertook an exacting study of the formulas for seventeenth-century paints and experimented with volatile flower oils to produce a pigment surface that had both the hardness of old paint and at the same time